In this paper, we consider the problem of secret key generation for multiple parties. Multi-user networks usually require a trusted party to efficiently distribute keys to the legitimate users and this process is a weakness against eavesdroppers. With the help of the physical layer security techniques, users can securely decide on a secret key without a trusted party by exploiting the unique properties of the channel. In this context, we develop a physical layer group key generation scheme that is also based on the ideas of the analog function computation studies. We firstly consider the key generation as a function to be computed over the wireless channel and propose two novel methods depending on the users' transmission capability (i.e. half-duplex and full duplex transmissions). Secondly, we exploit the uniqueness of the prime integers in order to enable the simultaneous transmission of the users for key generation. As a result, our approach contributes to the scalability of the existing physical layer key generation algorithms since all users transmit simultaneously rather than using pairwise communications. We prove that our half-duplex network model reduces the required number of communications for group key generation down to a linear scale. Furthermore, the full-duplex network model reduces to a constant scale.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE use of wireless technologies, as an indispensable part of our daily lives, also brings out additional vulnerabilities to communication systems as a result of its multiple access nature. The current applied method for hiding information from adversaries is the encryption and decryption of the messages at the upper layers. However, providing legitimate parties with a secret key without leaking to adversary is a weakness. Instead of using secrets keys, another perspective against eavesdropping is proposed in [1] by Wyner that the physical layer can be exploited to deny the adversary from correctly obtaining the messages from the channel. In the following years, Wyner's work has been carried further by Maurer [2] , Ahlswede and Csiszár [3] and these seminal studies created a new point of view to the physical layer and secrecy. Since then, this perspective has been extended to different wireless channel models (Gaussian wiretap [4] ) as well as various wireless technologies (artificial noise, beamforming [5] , [6] ) in order to improve its efficiency.
From an interesting perspective, physical layer studies intentionally reduce the capacity of the main channel in order to completely destroy the eavesdropper's reception [1] . As a result, the remaining transmission rate (secrecy capacity), is a crucial point in the network design. In order to overcome the capacity problem, physical layer key generation methods has been proposed [7] . These methods overcome the key distribution problem of the cryptic approaches by securely distributing keys to the legitimate users. For this purpose, entities that are special to the channel between two nodes such as fading and reciprocity has been exploited to generate secret keys to node pairs. The pairwise solutions also extended to the multiple node networks. While the broadcast nature of the wireless channel (as 1-to-M transmission) has been an assistant for group key generation, multiple access nature (as M -to-1 or M -to-M transmissions) is overlooked in the literature.
As the fading and reciprocity of the wireless channel is made use of for key generation, these concepts has also been the basis of analog function computation (AFC) studies, pioneered by Gastpar [8] , [9] and Stańczak [10] - [12] . However, the purpose and the method of AFC are completely different from the key generation algorithms. AFC exploits the multiple access nature of the wireless channel by targeting M-to-1 networks where a single sink node receives signals from the other nodes of the network.
Traditionally, communication and computation in these networks are separated as the sink node receives (communication) and processes (computation) each transmission individually. The aim of the AFC is to combine these two processes over the wireless multiple access channel (W-MAC) in order to relieve the sink node from its computational load. The method is based on matching the mathematical model of the W-MAC with the desired function by applying the pre and post processing steps [10] . A frequently used example of an AFC application is a sensor network gathering temperature measurements, where sink node is only interested in the average temperature. In AFC, following a pre-processing step, sensors simultaneously transmit their information and the superposition property of the W-MAC ensures that the sink node receives the average without any computation.
Inspired by AFC techniques, in this paper, we consider the problem of constructing a secret key for multiple parties by focusing on the fading and the multiple access nature of the W-MAC. An illustration of the proposed network model is given in Fig. 1 . With the observations from AFC methods, we match the W-MAC with a function that outputs secret keys to U 1 , ..., U N in the Fig. 1 . The signal processing used in AFC enables us to simply exploit the uniqueness of the fading such that the simultaneous communication is only meaningful at the spatial location of the legitimate users. We also use prime integers in the pre-processing step and thanks to the unique prime factorization theorem, legitimate users can correctly construct secret keys, S, in a simultaneous communication while Eve receives a corrupted version, S E .
A. Related Work 1) Physical layer key generation: Generating key from the channel for pairwise communication is studied by Maurer [2] and Csiszár [3] . In these studies, upper and lower bounds on the achievable key size are derived [2] and the key-capacity is defined as the maximum achievable key rate between two terminals without leaking information to a third terminal [3] . Information theoretic background of these works is extended to multiple terminals for the first time in [13] by Csiszár.
In the following years, a large amount of physical layer studies focus on the key generation problem and all of them exploit the unique channel characteristics for key generation. Some of these studies use a discrete channel model and are interested in the error probabilities of transmission packets chosen from binary alphabets [14] - [17] . The group key generation methods usually works with pairwise communications [18] - [20] resulting in scalability problems. Additionally, the studies using broadcast communication model (as 1-to-M transmission) require multiple sequential communications [21] - [23] . To our knowledge, this is the first paper considering simultaneous transmission over a wireless multiple access channel (as M-to-1 or M-to-M transmissions) for group key generation.
2) Analog Function Computation: Simultaneous transmission over a wireless multiple access channel is firstly exploited for the purpose of function computation (computational efficiency) in multi-node networks [8] , [10] . In the following studies, it is stated that any function is computable over the wireless channel with proper signal processing [12] , [24] . In [25] and [26] , the idea behind the AFC is extended to MIMO and beamforming technologies. Other than computational efficiency, AFC is used in sensor networks in order to increase the consensus rate of gossip algorithms in [27] , [28] . To our knowledge, this is the first study that exploits AFC for key generation by considering key distribution as a function to compute over the wireless channel.
B. Contributions
We propose two methods for multiple parties that provide N users with the same secret key and present the contributions of our methods as follows.
1) Traditional key exchange techniques require pair-wise communication rounds in order to provide N users with a secret key in the absence of multi-linear maps [29] . We exploit the multiple access nature of the W-MAC with the unique prime factorization theorem in order to reduce the communication rounds required for group key generation. 2) In the first method, we consider a network where the nodes are able to only transmit or receive at a time (half duplex). With the multiple access nature of the W-MAC, key generation of N users can be established in N communication rounds (by M-to-1 simultaneous transmission). This method reduces the required communication rounds to linear scale. 3) Considering that the communication between the users are full duplex (as in [30] , [31] ), the key generation can be established in one simultaneous communication (Mto-M) and the communication of the system is reduced to constant scale without the existence of the multilinear maps. 4) Proposed methods does not require trusted third party or any prior common secret between the users as opposed to traditional methods.
C. Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, background knowledge needed to present our methods are given with definitions. In Section III and IV, we present our key generation approaches which are based on half-duplex and full-duplex transmission, respectively. Secrecy of the proposed approaches are examined in Section V. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a network, where N users and an eavesdropper are spatially distributed at least half wavelength (λ/2) away and operating at the same frequency. Hence, it is assumed that any two wireless links in the system are uncorrelated from each other [32] . We denote the set of all users by U = {U 1 , . . . , U N }, where users are in an arbitrary order. We specify any transmitting user as U i ∈ U and any receiving user as U j ∈ U, where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, i = j. A set of prime integers are defined as P ⊆ N. Essentially, users are tasked to transmit and receive information in order to generate a secret key denoted by S. Meanwhile, it is assumed that an eavesdropper, E, is able to listen to the wireless channel and receive information.
As mentioned before, the proposed secret key generation methods are based on the superposition property and the fading of the W-MAC. Linear model of the W-MAC is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (W-MAC [11] ). Let x i be the signal transmitted by the user U i and let y j be the observation of W-MAC at the receiver end of the U j . The channel fading coefficient and the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) between the U i and U j are denoted by h ij and ω j , respectively. Then, we define the signal received by U j over the W-MAC as
As seen in (1), W-MAC matches with the summation operation when h ij = 1 and ω j = 0. Since the users are capable of estimating their channel fading coefficients with pilot sequences [33] , we can assume the effect of channel is reversible. Consequently, the conditions that matching the channel with summation is satisfiable and will be referred as ideal W-MAC. The authors in [12] prove that with proper adjustments to signals at transmitter and receiver ends, any desired function is computable over the W-MAC. The adjustments named as pre-processing and post-processing functions of transmitter and receiver ends respectively are defined as follows.
Definition 2 (pre-processing function [12] ). A process ϕ i defined as x ∈ R, ϕ i (x i ) = (ϕ • x i ) is the pre-processing function of the transmitter node U i . Definition 3 (post-processing function [12] ). A process ψ j defined as x ∈ R, ψ j (y j ) = (ψ j • y j ) is the post-processing function of the receiver node U j .
Basically, pre-processing and post-processing functions are means to adjust the channel model to represent desired functions. An example of these functions can be given for multiplication operation in order to narrow the focus on the proposed methods. Multiplication of information over the W-MAC is the main idea that our algorithms built on. The preprocessing function of multiplication can be written as
Remark 1. In AFC applications, channel is assumed to be ideal W-MAC since it is inverted beforehand. As a result, pre-processing functions do not contain channel estimation process and the channel fading coefficient, h ij , is not shown.
Here, we explicitly include the fading component into the preprocessing functions since it will be a key factor in full-duplex transmission of the users.
Natural property of logarithm enables us to obtain the logarithm based product of signals. Accordingly, conversion to polynomial base is required at the receiver end. Postprocessing function
completes the reconstruction of multiplication of signals at the the receiver end. For the output of the post-processing function given in (3), the background steps are given below
In sensor networks, a desired function is required in the FC, therefore W-MAC is modeled as compatible with one receiver in AFC applications. For secret generation purpose, we require every user to be an FC. As a solution, two different methods are proposed with different modeling of the W-MAC in the next sections.
III. HALF DUPLEX TRANSMISSION BASED SECRET GENERATION
The first method for secret generation is based on the idea that a user can obtain a function of information from other users to generate a secret key in one simultaneous communication. Repeating the communication for N users results in a network where all users have the same secret key. As in the AFC sensor network applications, all users work half-duplex where a user either transmits or receives. Accordingly, we model the W-MAC for half-duplex transmission based secret generation as follows.
Definition 4 (W-HMAC). Let N ∈ N be a finite number, j : {0 < j ≤ N } be a number and i : {{1, ..., N }, i = j} be a set of numbers. Let ϕ i (x i ) be the pre-processing function applied by the user U i and let ψ j (y j ) be the post-processing function applied by U j . Then, we define
the post-processed output of W-MAC as W-HMAC.
An illustration of the W-HMAC is given in Fig. 2 . As shown in the figure, a user U j ∈ U acquires a function of information transmitted from the other users U i ∈ U \ U j . From this observation, we propose a scheme to generate secret key to U j in two steps as follows.
Initialization. All users, U, in the network choose a prime integer p i ∈ P and define their input to the W-HMAC as x i = p i . The pre-processing and post-processing functions of the W-HMAC is defined as follows
Secret Generation. Users communicate over the W-HMAC where an arbitrarily chosen U j ∈ U acquires the multiplication of the inputs given as
xN xN It should be noted that W-HMAC is half-duplex and U j only receives information. As a result the output of the W-HMAC does not include p j . Since U j already knows p j , by multiplying p j with ψ(p i ), U j can reach to a secret S = p j ψ(y j )
W-MAC
which includes information from all U. Thereafter, U j can generate any key using S depending on the application. The result gained from one communication is extended to the following theorem that provides N users with the same S. Proof. Output of the W-HMAC given in (7) can be expressed as
Since U j knows p j and ψ(y j ); S is solvable for U j . When the secret generation step is repeated N times in order where each user of U is chosen as U j once, solving S results with the same output for each U j since S is equal to the set of chosen prime integers regardless of U j .
In the next section, we present an algorithm that provides N users with the same secret key in one round of communication.
IV. FULL DUPLEX TRANSMISSION BASED SECRET GENERATION
In the second method a novel perspective for the W-MAC is considered. We propose the generation of the same secret key to N users with full-duplex communication of N users where each user simultaneously transmits and receives. Therefore, the channel model for full-duplex transmission is given as follows.
Definition 5 (W-FMAC). Let N ∈ N be a finite number and i, j ∈ {1, ..., N }. Let ϕ i (x i ) be the pre-processing function applied by the user U i , SIC be the self interference cancellation xN xN Fig. 3 . Illustration of W-FMAC where x 1 , ..., xn are inputs and ψ 1 (y 1 ), ..., ψ N (y N ) are outputs. W-FMAC is full-duplex adaptation of W-MAC with proper pre-processing and post-processing functions and self interference cancellation [34] generate secret key to N users. function and ψ j (y j ) be the post processing function applied by U j . Then, we define
W-MAC
the self interference canceled and post-processed output of W-MAC as W-FMAC.
W-FMAC outputs a function of inputs of U i to U j as depicted in Fig. 3 . Unlike the W-HMAC where only one U j receives a function of information, W-FMAC outputs different functions of information to each U j . This stems from the fact that the channel fading coefficient from U i to U j is different; hence, regardless of any pre-process, multiple U j are going to receive different functions of information.
Remark 2. AFC methods are able to compute desired functions on the grounds that fading of the W-MAC is inverted. Since this is not possible for multiple receivers and fading effects the inputs; outputs of the W-FMAC are not only different but also meaningless functions.
Although any U j obtains a different function, we propose a method to salvage enough information to generate the same secret key to all U in one simultaneous communication over the W-FMAC. The proposed method is explained in two steps as follows.
Initialization. All users in U choose a prime integer p i ∈ P and define their input to the W-FMAC as x i = p i . The preprocessing and post-processing functions of the W-FMAC is defined as follows
where h * is defined such that h ij h * = c ij , ∀i, j and c ij ∈ Z + . Aim of the novel pre-processing function is to alter the W-MAC such that the effect of the fading to inputs becomes a positive integer. Thereby, output functions contain meaningful information despite they are still different for multiple receivers. In other words, since x 1 , ..., x N are prime integers and the effect of the fading is positive integer, by the nature of the prime numbers, ψ 1 (y 1 ), . . . , ψ N (y N ) contain each input with different exponents.
Secret Generation. All users in U communicate over the W-FMAC with given initial inputs and pre-processing and postprocessing functions. The output of W-FMAC for any U j ,
has retractable information on the inputs. By factorizing the output, U j obtains the product of inputs. However, input of the U j is removed by SIC (as in [34] ), and p j does not appear in the output. Since U j already knows p j , by multiplying p j with the product of inputs, U j obtains the secret key
which includes input of all users of U. After that, any desired key can be generated by using S. Obtained result on (13) leads to the following theorem. Proof. S given in (13) is solvable by U j since U j knows p j and ( N i=1 p i ) is extractable from ψ(y j ) by factorization. Solving S results in the same output for each user in U since S is equal to the set of chosen prime integers regardless of U j .
V. SECRECY OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES
The main idea behind the secrecy of information sharing comes from the destructive effect of the W-MAC on transmitted signals. For this purpose, information is carried on the amplitudes of the signals. With pre-processing and postprocessing functions, as defined in W-HMAC and W-FMAC, the information required to generate a secret key is passed along to other users only to be meaningful at the receiver of the targeted users.
As this alone would be a quite simple characteristic to hide information from eavesdroppers, broadcast nature of W-MAC exploited with simultaneous transmission of multiple users makes the recovery of meaningful information impossible. In addition, simultaneous transmission establishes the efficiency of our methods on the time slots required as W-HMAC needs N and W-FMAC needs one time slot to provide N users with the same secret key. As the fading and the broadcast nature of the W-MAC are the two complementary security layers of our methods, we examine the amount of information that E obtains under these layers in the following context of this section.
A. Secrecy of the Secret Generation over W-HMAC As mentioned before, communication over the W-HMAC provides U j with the input information of the other users in the network. With p j and ψ(y); U j can generate S and use it with any algorithm for encryption and decryption processes. As long as the algorithm is secure, the only way for E to obtain the secret key is to obtain signals correctly towards U j by being physically present close to U j . However, obtaining the output of W-HMAC is not enough to construct S, since E still needs the input of the U j .
Only solution for E to obtain all the information to construct S is the eavesdropping of at least 2 rounds of communications where minimum 2 users in U receive output sequentially from W-HMAC. In this case, E receives the following expression from one sniffing,
After the post-process, E obtains
as output of the W-HMAC. Note that the quantity E obtained contains exponentially distorted versions of inputs which brings us to the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let ψ j (y j ) be the output U j receives from the W-HMAC and r ij = h ij /h iE . As long as |1 − r ij | = 0, the output E obtains from the W-HMAC, ψ E (y E ), is different from the output U j obtains.
Proof. Difference between the W-HMAC outputs of U j and E is the following expression,
which can be organized as
Note that E will have a discrepancy once the error, E r , is not 0 and it occurs when |1 − r ij | is not equal to 0.
Depending on the channel fading coefficient, choosing high digit prime integers makes decipher of S infeasible since high discrepancy occurs between the W-HMAC output of E and U j . Following lemma and example given below illustrate the destructive effect of the fading and simultaneous transmission on Eve's computation. Lemma 1. Let s = 1.a 1 a 2 a 3 . . . a m be a real number where m represents the length of the decimal part such that the first non-zero term in the decimal part is a r for some positive integer r. Then n · s has the same first r digits with n and the remainders will be different.
Proof. Proof is given in Appendix A.
Example 1. Suppose each user has selected a prime integer with at least 6 digits and E obtains ψ E (y E ). Let |r ij | > 1.0001 then from Lemma 1, last two digits of the prime numbers which was selected by U i will change and the multiplication ψ E (y E ) will be completely different (except maybe first two digits) than ψ j (y j ).
An observation from Example 1 is the effect of number of users. Since each input of U i will be distorted by |r ij |, a linear increment in the number of users will exponentially increase the discrepancy that E faces.
B. Secrecy of the Secret Generation over W-FMAC
Secret generation over W-FMAC outputs N different functions of the inputs to N users. Common information of these N functions is that N inputs exist in a function with different exponents. The input of the U j is removed by SIC before post-process. Since E receives the raw signal (with the unwanted input), sniffed output that E obtains will be distorted even when E is physically close to a user. It is also infeasible for E to obtain ψ j (y j ). The underlying reason will be explained in the following discussion. E receives the following expression from W-FMAC,
where
When we look at the difference of the W-FMAC outputs given below; r ij has a mirror term, c ij in the U j 's output which is an integer, 
If we substitute r ij with v ij c ij where v ij = r ij /c ij , above expression becomes
which is under the statement that Theorem 3 provides. Our conclusion from the Theorem 3 is that the secret keys generated over the W-FMAC is secure against eavesdroppers.
VI. CONCLUSION
We model the W-MAC with proper pre-processing and postprocessing functions in order to match the W-MAC with a function that outputs a secret key which includes information from other users. Two different models, W-HMAC and W-FMAC are presented for half-duplex and full-duplex communications, respectively. Secret key is generated to N users over the W-HMAC in N concurrent transmission. In the second method, N users generate a secret key over the W-FMAC in one simultaneous transmission. We also examine the secrecy of our methods. It is shown that generated secret keys are secure against a passive eavesdropper. As a complementary future work, we consider to investigate and to combat the effect of noise in the proposed methods.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THE LEMMA 1
Let n = n 1 n 2 . . . n d where d is the number of digits of n. The decimal representation: n = n 1 · 10 d−1 + n 2 · 10 d−2 + · · · + n d−1 · 10 + n d and s = 1+a 1 · 1 10 +a 2 · 1 10 2 +· · ·+a r 1 10 r +a r+1 1 10 r+1 +· · ·+a m 1 10 M as a r is the first non-zero term in the decimal part a 1 = a 2 = · · · = a r−1 = 0 and s = 1 + a r 1 10 r + a r+1 1 10 r+1 + · · · + a m 1 10 M Then n × s = n 1 × 10 d−1 + n 2 × 10 d−2 + · · · + n d · 1 + a 1 1 10 r + a 2 1 10 r+1 + . . . a m 1 10 m = n 1 × 10 d−1 + n 2 × 10 d−2 + · · · + n d +a r n 1 × 10 d−r−1 + · · · + n d × 10 −r +a r+1 n 1 × 10 d−r−2 + · · · + n d × 10 −(r+1) + · · · + a m n 1 × 10 d−m−1 + · · · + n d × 10 −m = n 1 × 10 d−1 + n 2 × 10 d−2 + · · · + (n d−r−1 + n 1 )× 10 d−r−1 + (n d−r−2 + n 2 + n 1 ) × 10 d−r−2 .
Hence multiplication results in the number with the same first r (or r − 1) digits as the number n.
